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DRAFT TELEGRAM

ACTION: USIN, New York

UN PRESENCE IN CARIBBEAN

While Castro has been adamant against UN inspection in Cuba, door is not necessarily closed to agreement on some form of inspection provided it is not limited to Cuba and broadened to include other countries contiguous to Cuba. Democlarised zone idea contained in Brazilian resolution offers best practical prospect over long range, but such an agreement covering all of Latin America will take long time to negotiate due to complexities involved. However, there may be a more immediate and interim step that can be taken now which could be stepping stone to broader democlarised zone agreement embracing all LA countries. Such an interim step, if supplemented by our own continued aerial and sea surveillance and IACG inspection of incoming ships and cargoes, might offer practical way to add additional international increment to inspection process and embrace Cuba.

Interim step would be to have S G, pursuant to Article 9, seek establish, through consultations with Castro and key LA Lats, UN presence limited in first instance to Caribbean area (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela and Cuba). Such UN presence could be made up of a principal representative of SVO (Spinelli-Italy, or preferably prominent LA) and moderate size staff (about 35).

SVO's Rep would have mandate of assuring that no offensive weapons are received by countries in Caribbean area. UN rep and staff would not be located in Cuba but would have headquarters in Haiti or some other

/s/italic

suitable Caribbean country. This might make arrangements somewhat more palatable to Cuba. Mandate would include complete freedom of movement to SIG's rep and staff. Competent military and technical inspection teams would be included on staff with a right to go to any country in Caribbean at any time without prior invitation. Staff would be recruited by SC from countries within Caribbean area. Mixed teams would inspect; in no case would self inspection be permitted by nationals from country being inspected. SC would be called upon to authorize SIG to undertake arrangements. In order for arrangements be more palatable to UN, cost of UN presence would be defrayed not through regular budget but participating Caribbean nations. It would also be desirable to have UN support such an arrangement to UN by means of a resolution or at least give its blessing to it after arrangements had been worked out by SIG. UN might also provide liaison rep at UN representative's headquarters, once UN presence in Caribbean established.

ADDITIONAL

There are serious disadvantages with above proposal.

First, since SIG would insist upon UN authorisation, it would intrude Soviet veto into a Western Hemisphere arrangement. This might be avoided if we were able convince SIG to establish UN presence in Caribbean entirely pursuant to his authority under Article 99. While this was done in Laos, presence there was much more modest, and it likely that Thant would at least insist upon an after-the-fact approval by SC. This would

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[REDACTED]

Moreover } we would have to take great care, as in case of Brazilian
revolution, to avoid getting into question of transit of nuclear weapons
through Panama Canal and overflights in Caribbean.

Fourth, it would be just about as difficult to establish a limited UK presence for Caribbean as it is a demuclearized zone for all of Latin America. Considerable time would be needed to negotiate such an arrangement, and therefore it would not be possible to put it into practical operation in early days of post-missile removal period. In these circumstances, it would appear preferable to pursue Brazilian demuclearized zone concept at outset rather than seek more limited UK presence arrangement for Caribbean.